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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Many would gladly pay Tuesday for a hamburger 
today. Of course, not all of those who fall into debt make 
payments timely, and debt collection has become a 
professional trade. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(the “FDCPA” or “Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., regulates 
their efforts. Under it, debt collectors are prohibited from 
engaging in deceptive, abusive, or otherwise unfair practices 
to collect debts. When these practices occur, the Act gives 
debtors a private right of action to seek recourse, with the 
possibility of receiving statutory damages.  
The Act does not apply, however, to all entities who 
collect debts; only those whose principal purpose is the 
collection of any debts, and those who regularly collect debts 
owed another are subject to its proscriptions. Those entities 
whose principal business is to collect the defaulted debts they 
purchase seek to avoid the Act’s reach. We believe such an 
entity is what it is—a debt collector. If so, the Act applies. 
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I.  Background 
A.  “Debt Collectors” Under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act 
The FDCPA is a “remedial legislation” aimed, as 
already noted, “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices 
by debt collectors.” Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 
168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting § 1692(e); Caprio v. 
Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 
(3d Cir. 2013)). Importantly, it applies only to “debt 
collectors,” Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 
403 (3d Cir. 2000), defined as any person: (1) “who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any 
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 
any debts” (the “principal purpose” definition); or (2) “who 
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (the 
“regularly collects for another,” or “regularly collects,” 
definition).1 § 1692a(6). Specifically excluded from the 
definition’s reach are, in relevant part, a creditor’s officers 
and employees collecting debts for the creditor, a company 
collecting debts only for its non-debt-collector sister 
company, an entity collecting a debt it originated, and one 
collecting a debt it obtained that was not in default at the time 
of purchase. § 1692a(6)(A), (B), (F). 
 “Creditors—as opposed to ‘debt collectors’—
generally are not subject to the [Act].” Pollice, 225 F.3d at 
403. A “creditor” is any person: (1) “who offers or extends 
                                              
1 Though not relevant here, the definition of “debt collector” 
also includes “any person who uses any instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” 
§ 1692a(6). 
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credit creating a debt[;] or” (2) “to whom a debt is owed.” 
§ 1692a(4). Excluded is “any person to the extent that he 
receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely 
for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for 
another.” Id. Notably, the Act, by its terms, contemplates that 
an entity may be both a debt collector and a creditor, stating 
that “debt collector” also includes “any creditor who, in the 
process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than 
his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting 
or attempting to collect such debts.” § 1692a(6).  
The landscape of debt collection has changed since the 
FDCPA’s enactment in 1977, and not all those who collect 
debt look like the classic “repo man.” The Federal Trade 
Commission reported in 2009 that “[t]he most significant 
change in the debt collection business in recent years has 
been the advent and growth of debt buying.” Federal Trade 
Commission, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of 
Change – A Workshop Report 13 (2009). No longer do 
creditors simply hire debt collectors to serve their named role; 
rather, with increased frequency creditors sell debt to 
purchasers, who may again resell the debt, hire outside debt 
collectors to undertake collection efforts, or attempt to collect 
on their own. See Federal Trade Commission, The Structure 
and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry 1 (2013). Since this 
shift, courts have had to find new ways to distinguish “debt 
collectors” from “creditors” to determine whether the FDCPA 
applies to a particular entity. 
In Pollice we followed the “default” test to make that 
determination. Per that test, “an assignee of an obligation is 
not a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is not in default at the 
time of the assignment; conversely, an assignee may be 
deemed a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is already in 
default when it is assigned.” 225 F.3d at 403. Applying the 
test to an entity alleged to be a “debt collector,” we held that 
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because “there [was] no dispute that the various claims 
assigned to [it] were in default prior to their assignment[,] . . . 
[and] there [was] no question that the ‘principal purpose’ of 
[its] business [was] the ‘collection of any debts,’” the entity 
was a debt collector. Id. at 404. 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Check Investors, Inc., 
502 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2007), we applied Pollice to similarly 
situated entities whose principal business was the collection 
of debts. Id. at 172. The alleged debt collectors argued they 
were “creditors” because they collected debts owed to 
themselves as opposed to “debt collectors” who collect debts 
owed to another. Id. Because they owned the debt they 
collected, they claimed they were not subject to the Act. Id. 
We noted in a dictum that the entities “appear[ed] at first 
blush to satisfy the statutory definition of a creditor,” yet, “as 
to a specific debt, one cannot be both a ‘creditor’ and a ‘debt 
collector,’ as defined in the [Act], because those terms are 
mutually exclusive.” Id. at 173.  
We again followed the “default” test to determine 
whether the entity was a creditor or instead a debt collector, 
but pointed out that “focusing on the status of the debt when 
it was acquired overlooks . . . that the person engaging in the 
collection activity may actually be owed the debt and is, 
therefore, at least nominally a creditor.” Id. We justified our 
use of the “default” test by reasoning that “Congress . . . 
unambiguously directed our focus to the time the debt was 
acquired in determining whether one is acting as a creditor or 
debt collector under the [Act].” Id. We noted that the Act’s 
legislative history explained the term “debt collector” as 
“intended to cover all third persons who regularly collect 
debts,” id., because independent debt collectors, unlike 
creditors, are not “restrained by the desire to protect their 
good will when collecting past due accounts.” Id. (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 95–382, at 2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696). 
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Instead, they likely will have “no future contact with the 
consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer’s 
opinion of them.” Id. 
The Supreme Court, in Henson v. Santander Consumer 
USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017), has recently repealed the 
“default” test we followed. Debtors claimed that Santander 
Bank, which had purchased their loans already in default and 
attempted to collect on them, met the second definition of 
“debt collector,” i.e., one who “regularly collects or attempts 
to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.” Id. at 1721 
(quoting § 1692a(6)). They asserted as well that the Bank met 
the “principal purpose” definition, but the Court did not 
review that claim because it was not litigated in the District 
Court. Id.  
The Supreme Court began “with a careful examination 
of the statutory text,” in particular the definition’s limitation 
to debts “owed . . . another.” Id. It reasoned that “by its plain 
terms this language seems to focus our attention on third 
party collection agents working for a debt owner—not on a 
debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” Id. This 
language does not suggest that “whether the owner originated 
the debt or came by it only through later purchase” 
determines if it is a debt collector. Id. “All that matters is 
whether the target of the lawsuit regularly seeks to collect 
debts for its own account or does so for ‘another.’” Id. Hence 
the Bank, which collected debts for its own account, did not 
meet the “regularly collects for another” definition. Id. at 
1721–22. 
The debtors in Henson further argued that the 
“default” test ought to apply because the statute excludes 
from the definition of “debt collector” those who obtain debts 
before default, and therefore those who obtain debts after 
default must fit the definition. Id. at 1724 (citing 
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§ 1692a(6)(F)(iii)). The Court held that argument untenable 
because “it doesn’t necessarily follow that the [‘regularly 
collects’] definition [of ‘debt collector’] must include anyone 
who regularly collects debts acquired after default;” to meet 
that definition, those debts must be “owed another.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
The Court also addressed the suggestion that everyone 
who attempts to collect debt is either a “debt collector” or a 
“creditor” with respect to a particular debt, but cannot be 
both. Id. “[S]potting (without granting) th[at] premise,” it 
stated that a company such as the Bank, which collects on 
debt it purchased for its own account, “would hardly seem to 
be barred from qualifying as a creditor under the statute’s 
plain terms.” Id. But excluded from the definition of 
“creditor” are those who acquire a debt after default when the 
debt is assigned or transferred “solely for the purpose of 
facilitating collection of such debt for another.” Id. (quoting 
§ 1692a(4)) (emphases in original). 
Only one of our sister circuits has applied Henson thus 
far in a precedential opinion.2 In Bank of New York Mellon 
                                              
2 The Fifth Circuit, in a non-precedential opinion, ruled that 
because Henson held “that debt purchasers who collect for 
their own accounts are not ‘debt collectors’ under the 
‘regularly collects’ alternative,” the plaintiff failed to state a 
claim to that effect. Infante v. Law Office of Joseph 
Onwuteaka, P.C., No. 17-41071, 2018 WL 2438153, at *2 
(5th Cir. May 30, 2018). The Sixth Circuit ruled much the 
same, also in a non-precedential opinion. Garner v. Select 
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 17-1303, 2017 WL 8294293, at 
*3 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit 
has since applied its pre-Henson standard that “a non-
originating debt holder [does not qualify as] a ‘debt collector’ 
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Trust Co. N.A. v. Henderson, 862 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 
the D.C. Circuit ruled on whether the Bank of New York, 
which regularly purchased and collected on defaulted loans, 
was a “debt collector” or instead a “creditor” under the Act. 
Id. at 33–34. As there was “no evidence to indicate the 
Bank’s ‘principal’ business is debt collection[,] []or [that] the 
debt the Bank is seeking to collect [is] ‘due another,’” the 
Court (following Henson) held the Bank of New York was 
not a debt collector. Id. No sister circuit has yet opined on 
Henson’s applicability to the “principal purpose” definition of 
“debt collector,” the task before us today. 
B.  Facts 
Appellees James and Allison Tepper, husband and 
wife, entered into a home equity line of credit with NOVA 
Bank secured by a mortgage on their Pennsylvania home. 
Tepper v. Amos Financial, LLC, No. 15-cv-5834, 2017 WL 
3446886, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017). The Teppers 
received periodic statements regarding their loan, and made 
timely payments, until the Pennsylvania Department of 
Banking and Securities closed the Bank and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed as receiver. Id. 
at *2. 
The Teppers were notified of the Bank’s closure, the 
FDIC’s role as receiver, and its intention to market and sell 
all of the Bank’s assets, including their loan. Id. Though the 
Teppers stopped receiving periodic statements, they 
attempted to remit a periodic payment to the FDIC, but it 
neither cashed nor returned their check. Id. Rather than 
                                                                                                     
. . . solely because the debt was in default at the time it was 
acquired” (which, it noted, Henson confirmed). Kurtzman v. 
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 709 F. App’x 655, 659 (11th Cir. 
2017) (citation omitted) (first alteration in original). 
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attempt to make further payments to the FDIC, the couple 
decided to wait until they received a periodic statement from 
the loan’s new servicer. Id. 
Some months later, the FDIC declared the loan to be in 
default and sold it, also assigning the mortgage securing the 
loan, to Appellant Amos Financial, LLC. Id. at *2–3. It is an 
Illinois limited liability company that first registered to 
conduct business in Pennsylvania in October 2015. Not a 
financial institution or lender, its sole business is purchasing 
debts entered into by third parties and attempting to collect 
them. Id. at *1. The FDIC notified the Teppers of both the 
loan’s default and its transfer to Amos, who made several 
attempts to collect the amount due. Id. at *1, 3–4. Amos 
mailed the Teppers three letters demanding lump-sum 
payments and sent them a notice, containing a higher amount 
due, stating that it intended to foreclose on their home. Id. at 
*3–4. It then filed a foreclosure action in Pennsylvania court 
in March 2015. Id. at *4. At that time, Amos was not 
registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Id. at *1, 4. 
James Tepper reached out to Amos to request loan 
statements and to resolve the loan’s default and avoid 
foreclosure. Id. at *4–5. Nareg Korogluyan, an Amos officer, 
returned his call. Id. at *5. He refused to give Mr. Tepper any 
loan statements, said the Teppers’ home belonged to Amos, 
and warned they could not stop its foreclosure. Id. at *5–6.  
An attorney, acting on behalf of Amos, then sent Mr. Tepper 
an email attempting to collect the debt, but at an even higher 
amount. Id. at *6. 
C.  Procedural History 
The Teppers filed a complaint alleging Amos violated 
the FDCPA and Amos timely replied. In their pretrial filings, 
the Teppers argued that Amos was a “debt collector” as 
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defined in § 1692a(6) of the Act because their loan was in 
default and Amos considered the loan to be in default when it 
was purchased. They alleged Amos violated the Act through 
its written and oral communications with the Teppers, in part 
because it was not registered to do business in Pennsylvania 
when it threatened and filed foreclosure.  
Amos, in its pretrial filings, did not contest its status as 
a “debt collector” under the Act. Rather, it argued it was not 
required to register in Pennsylvania as a foreign business 
entity because its sole business was acquiring and collecting 
debt. During the one-day bench trial that followed, 
Korogluyan testified to the same and added that the higher 
loan amount was calculated using an increased interest rate.  
The District Court requested post-trial memoranda 
from the parties. In their memorandum, the Teppers argued 
Amos violated the FDCPA because it increased their loan’s 
interest rate without first terminating and accelerating the 
loan, which their credit agreement required. Amos, in its 
memorandum, again did not challenge its status as a debt 
collector, and repeated that it was not required to register in 
the Commonwealth because its sole business was collecting 
the debt it acquired.  
After the trial and the post-trial supplemental briefing, 
but before the District Court issued a decision, the Supreme 
Court decided Henson. In response, the District Court ordered 
additional briefing for the parties to address whether, in light 
of Henson, Amos qualifies as a debt collector.  
Thereafter the Court decided: (1) Amos is a “debt 
collector” as defined in § 1692a(6); (2) the Teppers’ loan is a 
“debt” as defined in § 1692a(5) of the Act; and (3) Amos 
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violated the Act.3 Tepper, 2017 WL 3446886, at *7–10. 
Amos was not liable for failing to register as a foreign 
business in Pennsylvania, however, because it is a debt 
collector. Id. at *10. It appeals the District Court’s decision, 
arguing that it is not a debt collector. Accordingly, we 
summarize only the Court’s reasoning for that part of its 
decision. 
Taking heed from Henson, the District Court looked 
first to the statute’s text. Id. at *7. It explained there are two 
ways for a plaintiff to prove a defendant is a debt collector: 
either (1) its “principal purpose . . . is the collection of any 
debts,” or (2) it “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . 
debts owed or due . . . another.” Id. at *8 (quoting § 1692a). It 
explained that, following Henson, an entity that purchases 
debts and then seeks to collect them for its own account is 
ineligible for the second definition because it is limited to 
those who regularly collect debts due a third party. Id. By 
contrast, the first definition applies to “collection of any 
debts” so long as that activity is the entity’s “principal 
                                              
3 Specifically, the Court held: (1) Amos’s foreclosure notice 
and email that failed to disclose sufficient details about the 
amount and character of the debt were incomplete and 
misleading in violation of §§ 1692e(2) and (10); (2) its 
calculation of the loan amount at an increased interest rate 
without following the credit agreement’s required procedures 
violated § 1692e; and (3) Korogluyan’s statements that Amos 
owned the Teppers’ home and they could not stop the 
foreclosure constituted false representations and deceptive 
means to collect on the loan in violation of § 1692e(10). 
Tepper, 2017 WL 3446886, at *10. The Court also ordered 
$1,000 in statutory damages to the Teppers and deemed them 
entitled to recoup costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Id. at 
*11. 
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purpose.” Id. (citing § 1692a). The parties did not dispute that 
Amos’s sole business activity is purchasing and then 
attempting to collect debts. Id. Hence the Court held Amos 
meets the first definition of debt collector. Id. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and we have jurisdiction to review its decision under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the Court’s conclusions 
of law and review for clear error its factual findings. Battoni 
v. IBEW Local No. 102 Employee Pension Plan, 594 F.3d 
230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. Discussion 
 Henson did not decide, but nonetheless affects, who 
fits the “principal purpose” definition of “debt collector.” 
Whereas, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, our 
precedent in Pollice and Check Investors instructed us to look 
at whether the debt was in default at the time it was 
purchased, after Henson the “default” test falls away for a 
“principal purpose” framework. 
We take our cue from the Court to begin by carefully 
examining the statute’s text. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721. Both 
Amos and the Teppers contend the plain text of the statute 
supports their desired outcome—Amos arguing that it fits the 
definition of “creditor” and therefore it is not a “debt 
collector” because the terms are mutually exclusive, and the 
Teppers arguing it fits the “principal purpose” definition of 
“debt collector.”  
We do not overlook Amos’s omission of the “principal 
purpose” definition from its argument. Its admitted sole 
business is collecting debts it has purchased. It uses the mails 
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and wires for its business. It can be no plainer that Amos 
“uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails 
in any business the principal purpose of which is the 
collection of any debts.” § 1692a(6). “Any debts” does not 
distinguish to whom the debt is owed. And it stands in 
contrast to “debts owed or due . . . another,” which limits only 
the “regularly collects” definition. See Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 
1723 (“[W]hen we’re engaged in the business of interpreting 
statutes we presume differences in language . . . convey 
differences in meaning.”). Asking if Amos is a debt collector 
is thus akin to asking if Popeye is a sailor. He’s no cowboy. 
Amos claims that because it also meets the definition 
of creditor—it is the entity “to whom [the] debt is owed,” 
§ 1692a(4)—it is not a debt collector. In Check Investors we 
noted an entity may satisfy the statutory definition of 
“creditor” and yet be a “debt collector.” 502 F.3d at 173. Our 
conclusion today does not require us to sort out what Check 
Investors intended by its statement that those terms are 
mutually exclusive. Suffice it to say that, following Henson, 
an entity that satisfies both is within the Act’s reach. 
Amos argues as its fallback position that if we do not 
find it is a creditor (to the exclusion of being a debt collector), 
we should hold that it is not a debt collector under the 
definition’s exclusion for “officer[s] [and] employee[s] of a 
creditor [who], in the name of the creditor, [are] collecting 
debts for [the] creditor.” § 1692a(6)(A). This exception 
clearly does not fit; for even if Amos is a nominal creditor, 
the Teppers sued Amos, a limited liability company, and not 
any of its officers or employees.  
* * * * * 
In sum, Amos may be one tough gazookus when it 
attempts to collect the defaulted debts it has purchased, but 
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when its conduct crosses the lines prescribed by the FDCPA, 
it opens itself up to the Act’s penalties. The District Court 
held that Amos’s debt-collection attempts with the Teppers 
crossed those lines, and it must face the statute’s penalties for 
its bad behavior. We affirm the portion of the Court’s opinion 
Amos has challenged on appeal—that it is a debt collector 
under the “principal purpose” definition. The Court decided 
correctly in light of Henson’s repeal of the “default” test. 
Whether an entity acquired the debts it collects after they 
became defaulted does not resolve whether that entity is a 
debt collector. Instead, we follow the plain text of the statute: 
an entity whose principal purpose of business is the collection 
of any debts is a debt collector regardless whether the entity 
owns the debts it collects. 
 Thus we affirm. 
